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Have structural factors influenced german FDI
in Latin America? A panel econometric analysis
for the 1990s*
TORSTEN WEZEL **
I. INTRODUCTION
With hindsight, the 1990s were the decade of initial emerging
market exuberance and subsequent disillusionment. Foreign direct
investment flows to prospering regions such as Latin America and,
most prominently, Asia grew by leaps and bounds – from about the
mid-1980s to the second half of the 1990s average annual worldwide
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FDI flows to developing countries increased eightfold1 – nourishing
hopes for sustainable growth by transforming the host countries’
infrastructure and enhancing their ability to withstand global
economic downturns. As a matter of fact, German FDI stocks (at
book values) in the six largest Latin American economies more
than doubled between end-1989 and end-1997. However, with the
Asian crisis the long-held belief of emerging economies’
invulnerability was shattered, and it became apparent that warning
signs such as overvaluation of the currency, high foreign
indebtedness and the absence of long-overdue structural reforms
may not have been heeded by a majority of foreign enterprises.
The question then is: were those “red flags” in the sense of
worsening country and/or political risk assessments – representing
a subjective probability of certain adverse outcomes2 – perceived
by international investors? This study aims at identifying the
determinants of German FDI in the emerging economies of Latin
America throughout the past decade, and, in particular, those relating
to “governance” aspects, measured by indices of country or political
risk. Governance issues have consistently been, and still remain a
major challenge for emerging market economies. Despite having
undertaken substantial stabilization or liberalization efforts3 and
pursuing appropriate fiscal and monetary policies, many of these
countries are suffering from a wide range of political and regulatory
deficiencies which need to be tackled to appease investors. At first
glance, emerging economies feature proper investment regimes
when in fact obscure licensing procedures and discretionary
administrative regulations characterize the true nature of the
country’s investment policy. Even willing governments are often
unable to convey credible signals to foreign investors.4
1  See Nunnenkamp (2001), p. 4, who presents UNCTAD data.
2  Definition by Lehmann (1999), p. 22.
3  Lora (2001) provides cross-country evidence on structural reforms in Latin America
(see section 2.2.2).
4  See Lehmann (1999), p. 21.
Have Structural Factors Influenced German FDI in Latin America? 185
Most empirical research using German FDI data has been
undertaken with respect to industrialized economies. Only a few
studies are devoted exclusively to the investment behavior of German
enterprises in developing countries or emerging markets. Hubert
and Pain (1999) find in regressions restricted to non-EU countries,
i.e. essentially developing countries, that only stocks of research &
development, unit labor costs in Germany relative to the host country
and real exchange rate volatility turn out to be significant with the
expected signs. Similarly, only some German FDI studies employ
political risk variables. Agarwal et al. (1991), in a very comprehensive
study of the traditional and risk-related determinants of German
investment abroad, generally find no deterring effect of political
risk (composite risk and, separately, strikes and lockouts) on FDI
flows to developing countries in the 1980s. Moore (1993) identifies
an index of labor unrest in the 17 OECD countries examined.
Surprisingly, the number of days lost in strikes is mildly significant
and positively correlated with FDI flows. Jost and Nunnenkamp
(2002) run cross-section and pooled regressions for German FDI
in more than 60 developing countries between 1989 and 2000.
Apart from the usual results for host country per-capita GDP and
population, they find good scores for country risk as measured by
the Euromoney index and an openness measure (adjusted for country
size) as well as, in separate regressions, low political risk and a
skill variable (rate of secondary schooling) to exert a strong positive
influence on FDI stocks.
The paper is organized as follows. The subsequent section
first explains how the FDI flow variable used in this study is derived.
It then gives an overview of the literature on determinants of FDI
in emerging markets, and, particularly, those factors relating to risk
aspects. Section three provides details on the econometric approach
and the selection process used for identifying robust variables among
a pool of exogenous variables. The regression results are presented
in section four, with a distinction being made between the country,
sector and sub-sector level. Section five has the concluding remarks.
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II. DATA
II.1. Endogenous variable
There is no unanimously agreed method of measuring FDI.
Different studies proceed in different ways. It, therefore, seems
important to make as clear as possible how FDI has been defined
here and why this particular definition has been chosen. In this
study, the endogenous variable is the net inflow or outflow of
direct investment capital of German investors into emerging market
economies during a given calendar year. Depending on how one
looks at it, foreign direct investment may be understood purely as
a flow variable or as a stock variable. The IMF Balance of Payments
Manual does not exclusively recur to the cumulative stock of FDI
capital but defines direct investment as comprising “not only the
initial transaction establishing the relationship between the investor
and the enterprise but also all subsequent transactions between
them and among affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and
unincorporated”.5
The direct investment capital flows used in the estimations
are derived from the direct investment stock statistics compiled by
the Deutsche Bundesbank since 1976 as an annual complete survey
and published on a partly aggregated basis in Special Statistical
Publication No. 10 (“Kapitalverflechtung mit dem Ausland” –
“International capital links”). These data are now also available in
the form of a computer-aided microdatabase for the years 1989 to
2000.6 During the sample period, German enterprises reported
minority interests (of at least 10% but less than 50%) in foreign
enterprises if the balance-sheet total of the investment target
exceeded DM 10 million (in 1999: €5 million). Controlling interests
(50% or more) had to be reported if the investment target’s balan-
5 IMF (1997), p. 86. “Direct investment capital transactions include those that create
or dissolve investments as well as those that serve to maintain, expand, or reduce
investments”; ibid., p. 88.
6 In the 1989 reporting year methodological changes were made which eliminated the
comparability of the stocks with those in the years 1976 to 1988.
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ce-sheet total exceeded DM 1 million (in 1999: €0.5 million). Indirect
participating interests likewise must be reported if a “dependent”
(i.e. majority-owned) enterprise itself holds a stake of at least 10%
in another enterprise. It should be stressed, therefore, that foreign
direct investment merely represents the provision of financial ca-
pital – in this case by German enterprises to their foreign
subsidiaries.7
The direct investment stocks included in the database are
book values and are calculated as the sum total of the investor’s
share in the nominal capital of the investment target, the capital
reserves, and the retained profits and profits brought forward
(cumulative reinvested earnings). Loans granted by the capital
owners or affiliated enterprises are added to this equity capital. To
finally obtain the direct investment stock pursuant to the IMF’s
“directional principle”, the subsidiary’s lending to or claims on the
parent company must be subtracted.8 It should be noted that the
stock data quoted in foreign currency by the enterprise subject to
reporting requirements have to be converted into German currency
at the current exchange rate on the balance-sheet date (as mandated
by the OECD Benchmark Definition).9
7 Thus, the term “direct investment” has to be clearly distinguished from the neo-
classical concept of investment which is based on the change in value of capital goods (i.e.
property, plant & equipment) on the assets side of the balance sheet; see also Lehmann
(1999), p. 10, Hausmann and Fernández-Arias (2001), p. 33, or Razin (2002), p. 2.
8  See Lipponer (2003), p. 219. The “directional principle” requires the direct
investments to be separated according to the direction of the capital flow. Loans from
subsidiaries to the investor therefore have to be deducted from the direct investment capital;
see IMF (1997), p. 81. This practice contrasts with the asset liability principle, which
presents such assets as autonomous – counterbalancing – direct investments.
9  There is also the question of whether or not the stock data and thus also the FDI
stock differences (which, after suitable correction, are interpreted as flow data), should be
adjusted for inflation in the host country – as is done by Moore (1993), who deflates the
stock differences using foreign price indexes for capital goods – or for exchange rate effects
as recommended by Wagner (1991), who eschews Bundesbank stock data for these implicit
effects. Accordingly, previous-year FDI stocks or, more correctly, the stocks of fixed
assets and other long-term assets, would have to be adjusted for both inflation and the
change in the bilateral exchange rate in the reporting year. Alternatively, one might rightfully
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II.1.1. Stocks Versus Flows
In the Bundesbank’s stocks statistics the acquisition of assets
is recorded in the form of balance-sheet book values. However, in
the case of takeovers, an additional amount (goodwill) is frequently
paid on top of the pure book value of the assets. These additional
sums were particularly significant in recent years in cases of
technology company takeovers. Therefore, evaluating the transaction
data, which are recorded at market values in the balance of
payments, would be preferable – yet this raises other problems
(see below). However, as advanced developing countries rather
than industrialized countries are at the heart of this study, it may
be assumed that, owing to the relatively uncertain profit expectations
and a political environment which is often difficult to gauge, the
difference between market and book values may not be substantial.
In the case of newly established subsidiaries (i.e. greenfield
investment) these problems do not arise to begin with.
While transaction-based balance of payments data in this
respect seem superior for studying FDI flows, they have other
serious shortcomings. Only immediate direct investment relationships
(as to equity capital) are recorded under participating interests in
the German balance of payments statistics, but not indirect ones,
i.e. those held via a holding company, which likewise compulsorily
fall under the FDI definition. Nor are reinvested earnings stemming
from indirect capital links included. On balance, and leaving
accounting issues aside, merely considering balance of payments
data means failing to use a fully consolidated system encompassing
indirect ownership and, therefore, in all likelihood greatly understating
actual FDI capital.10 Therefore, in measuring the investment activity
assume that relative purchasing power parity holds and the inflation differential between
Germany and the host country in question is absorbed by the exchange rate, having both
distorting factors cancel each other out. To be sure, most empirical studies do not test
nominal values but either deflate the FDI variable or relate it either to GDP or some other
scaling factor (see section 2.1.3).
10  See OECD (1996), p. 11.
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of German multinationals, the only “relevant” flow variable – if
there is one to be had – should be derived from (adequately
modified) differences in stocks and not by using flows recorded in
the balance of payments. Accordingly, this study uses a modified
FDI “flow” variable, i.e. the difference in FDI stock from one year
to another, adjusted for actual participation rates, deviating reporting
years, balance-sheet depreciation and repatriated profits. This va-
riable nevertheless corresponds – apart from the distortions
mentioned above – to the basic definition of direct investment capital
transactions contained in the IMF’s Balance of Payments Ma-
nual.11
The balance-sheet values are shown in the stock statistics at
the respective reporting date of the direct investment enterprise
concerned, which sometimes differs from the end of the calendar
year. For practical reasons the unadjusted figures are not divided
between the two calendar years included in the reporting year of
such enterprises.12 Instead, all balance-sheet values of enterprises
whose reporting date falls before June 30 – i.e. whose reporting
year therefore mostly does not coincide with the current reporting
year of the stock statistics – are included in the preceding calendar
year.
11 “The components of direct investment capital transactions ... are equity capital,
reinvested earnings, and other capital associated with various intercompany debt
transactions”; IMF (1997), p. 87. Hausmann and Fernández-Arias (2001) explicitly adhere
to the flow concept: “FDI is defined as the increase in the equity position of a non-resident
owner...” (p. 33).
12  This applies to 1,451 of 10,629 reports (13.7%) or 11.1% of the total direct
investment capital for the six countries considered here. Theoretically, it would be possible
in these cases to include the balance-sheet values in the previous year linearly with the
period not coinciding with the year under review (for example, if May 31, 1999, were the
reporting date, seven-twelfths of the balance-sheet values originally included in 1999
would be assigned to the 1998 reporting/calendar year, with the value for 1999 being
adjusted accordingly). For technical reasons – this breakdown would require a “matching”
of the reporting numbers of the investor and the investment target over all of the sample
years at the microdata level, which is not feasible – this is not an option.
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II.1.2. Adjustment for Participation Rates, Balance-Sheet
Depreciation, Repatriated Profits
The FDI microdatabase contains participation rates for
indirectly owned interests (usually held via a holding company)
which need to be adjusted for the share of FDI capital that German
investors effectively hold. That is, the “real” participation rate is
calculated as the product of the vertical ownership shares. Doing
so is necessary to account for multiple ownership in holding
companies.13
As the assets are recorded as book values and are
depreciated by a certain rate mandated by foreign tax regulations,
the left-hand side of the balance sheet does not correspond to the
actually existing (historical) capital stock. This pure taxation effect
needs to be removed. Accordingly, by using a perpetual inventory
model, FDI stocks are adjusted for the original tax depreciation
undertaken when calculating the profit of the subsidiary; the aim of
this adjustment is to determine which fixed assets are available for
production each year. To this end, the net capital stock (fixed
assets) of the investment target is marked up for each year using
a notional depreciation rate of 8%,14 which is multiplied by the
share of FDI capital in total assets. The resulting gross capital
stock of the following period is adjusted for increases or decreases
in productive capital. By contrast, write-downs of financial assets,
especially those of service providers, are not adjusted because the
depreciation rate is uncertain. The inflow of direct investment capital
13  For example, if a holding company has a 50% stake in a direct investment company
and is itself equally owned by two German investors, the adjusted participation will be
25% for each parent.
14  The rate of 8% is used by Chennells and Griffith (1997), p. 92, calculated as the
average of economic depreciation rates for “industrial buildings” (3.6%) and for “industrial
plant and machinery” (12.3%).
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in a given period therefore is the difference of the stocks15 between
the current year’s stocks and preceding years’ stocks plus the
imputed depreciation of the adjusted capital stock.16
The resulting flow variable still includes the total annual surplus
rather than merely the profits remaining in the investment target
after transferring the parent company’s share of the profit – i.e.
reinvested profits. Accordingly, the profits of the previous year
repatriated in the current year would need to be deducted from this
flow variable.17 As this information cannot be extracted directly
from the FDI stock statistics, a suitable approximation is called for:
in the case of direct participating interests, the item “income from
dividends and other profits” relating to German outward FDI (as
recorded in the German balance of payments statistics18) is used.
For indirect participating interests, unfortunately, no such information
is available. For simplicity, a full profit transfer from the investment
target to the holding company (by virtue of a corresponding
agreement) is assumed. Accordingly, total profits are subtracted
15  In this connection it should be noted that, in the case of direct participating interests,
those in dependent holding companies which themselves hold at least a 10% stake in
another company have to be excluded from the stock of direct investment capital in order
to avoid double counting – these own participating interests are recorded separately as
indirect FDI. This approach is not applied to dependent holdings without participating
interests required to be reported or to minority-owned holdings with their own participating
interests; see Lipponer (2003), p. 218.
16  To give an example, the inflow (exclusive of repatriated profits) for the year 1991
is calculated as follows:
FDI Flow1991 = DFDI1991 + (DFA1991 + (DFA1990 + FA1989 * (1+d)) * (1+d)) * d,
where
DFDI = difference between the “original” direct investment stocks in the
reporting year and the previous year
FA = fixed assets * percentage share of assets (i.e. investor’s share
of capital)
d = notional depreciation rate (8%)
17  As was done, for instance, by Singh and Jun (1995), p. 11.
18  Deutsche Bundesbank, Statistical Supplement No. 3, Table 5b “Factor income –
income from direct investment“, column 2.
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from the indirect FDI capital in each year, yielding reinvested
earnings as the difference between the following year’s retained
profits/profits brought forward and those of the current year. This
difference is already reflected in the variation of FDI stocks across
years.19 A comparison of the flows derived from “raw” and adjusted
differences in FDI stocks illustrates that while these deviations
may not dramatically alter the econometric outcome, they can cause
individual variables to gain or lose significance.20
II.1.3 Absolute and Normalized FDI Flows
The study uses a principal endogenous variable, FDIGDP,
defined as outflows of German foreign direct investment to a given
host country as a percentage of its GDP (both in nominal values
(D-Marks)). The countries comprise the largest emerging market
economies21 in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico and Venezuela. Given that larger economies have
consistently been shown to receive larger FDI inflows (see section
2.2.1, market size), the above normalization is performed to eliminate
size effects and thus to determine the linkage between FDI flows
and the variations in external factors over and above absolute
market size as implied by GDP. Correspondingly, estimations are
centered on deviations from an implied average value of FDI flows
and size of host countries.
19  In principle, retained profits/profits brought forward would have to be subtracted
in the case of newly acquired direct investment companies. However, it is only for 1997-
1999 that such positions can be identified in the microdata by checking whether an
investment target surfaces in the database the following year. This is no longer possible
for the years 1989-1996 as data prior to 1996 have already been rendered anonymous. In
order to avoid additional bias due to incomplete adjustments, these equity positions are
left unchanged.
20  Referring to regressions in section 4, the trade taxation variable drops from a 1%
level of significance (unadjusted flows) to the 5% level (adjusted flows) while the reverse
is true for the agglomeration variable.
21  Selection criterion: ½ * (real GDPi,1990 + real GDPi, 1999), at constant 1995 US dollars
(World Development Indicators). The cut-off point was arbitrarily set at an average GDP
of US$ 60 billion (next in line was Peru ($ 50.0 billion)).
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Apart from log-linearizing FDI stocks, use of normalized FDI
variables (FDI inflows as share of GDP) is relatively widespread
in the literature on foreign direct investment. Froot and Stein (1991),
Singh and Jun (1995), Barrell and Pain (1999), Hausmann and
Fernández-Arias (2001), Nookbakhsh et al. (2001), Mody and
Murshid (2002) and Razin (2002) use the FDI to GDP ratio proposed
in this study. Similarly, Pistoresi (2000), Chakrabarti (2001) and
Nunnenkamp (2001) link their FDI variable to host country
population, i.e. per-capita FDI, while Lehmann (1999) computes
country shares in total U.S. capital expenditures as an investment
variable. Wheeler and Mody (1992) relate FDI in a given sample
country to investment in an arbitrarily chosen numeraire country.
Desai et al. (2003), while incorporating absolute GDP in their
regressions, do not even bother to report the estimates for the
market size variable because of the intuition that larger economies
tend to receive greater volumes of foreign direct investment.
II.2. Exogenous variables
In the vast FDI literature a great many explanatory variables
are employed to explain cross-border capital flows. Over time,
however, a distinctive set of factors frequently used in econometric
modeling has emerged. Lim (2001), surveying the FDI literature,
comes up with a list of seven important factors: size of the host
market, agglomeration effects, factor costs, fiscal incentives, busi-
ness/investment climate, trade barriers/openness, and economic
distance/transport costs. The latter factor can be neglected in this
study as the host countries included are all located overseas and
thus more or less equally far away from the country of FDI origin,
Germany. Theory and empirical evidence on the determinants cited
above are reviewed in the following section.
II.2.1. Traditional Variables
Due to space constraints, the description of the so-called
traditional variables is kept rather brief. Empirical evidence on
these factors is omitted but can be found in Wezel (2003).
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Market Size/Level of Income
Among the traditional variables, GDP or GDP per capita is
widely used in the literature as a proxy for market size or purcha-
sing power. Lim (2001) finds market size in terms of the size of
the whole economy (absolute real GDP) or the level of income
(GDP per capita) to be the most robust determinant, although both
factors depict quite different market characteristics. In virtually all
the studies surveyed, either indicator of market size is highly positively
significant (for an overview see the survey by Chakrabarti (2001)).
Since the endogenous variable is already scaled to GDP and
as absolute real GDP, by virtue of favoring large populations, is a
rather poor indicator of market potential, the paper includes GDP
per capita, GDPCAP, following Chakrabarti (2001) who finds this
variable strongly positively related to scaled (per-capita) FDI for a
sample of 135 countries.
Wage Competitiveness
Cost competitiveness – especially relevant for efficiency-
seeking FDI – is probably best expressed by productivity-adjusted
real wages, assuming that labor is largely immobile and labor costs
therefore differ across countries, while other cost drivers such as
capital and intermediate goods are traded on international markets
with price-equalizing effects.22 Moreover, measuring capital
productivity is more difficult than deriving unit labor costs, due to
the widespread unavailability of capital stocks at market values
and capital goods price indices as suitable deflators.23 Here, the
wage variable is unit labor costs, ULC, which is defined as the
labor costs per worker in manufacturing divided by the gross
22  See Turner and Golub (1997), p. 7.
23  See Lipsey (2002), p. 36. Barrell and Pain (1996) were forced to leave out the Latin
American region due to lack of reliable time series data on indigenous costs (p. 203).
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value added per worker in manufacturing.24 Ideally, weighted
labor costs for all sectors of the economy should be used, but it is
only for the manufacturing sector that data are available across all
countries in the sample. Still, such a generalization is not uncommon
in FDI research.25 Barrell and Pain (1999) also use manufacturing
unit labor costs for their country-level estimations, and later in
their paper run a separate regression for Japanese FDI flows to
manufacturing sectors abroad.
Trade Barriers/Openness of the Economy
Traditionally, direct investment was used by foreign firms to
circumvent trade barriers (“tariff-hopping”) and thus to establish
market presence by physically erecting production facilities or buying
existing ones abroad. It has been argued that host country
governments will be more likely to establish trade barriers if a
particular domestic industry facing import penetration is still at an
infant stage or if the product life cycle is already beyond the
hump.26 On the other hand, incipient trade restrictions may prompt
anticipatory or “quid pro quo” direct investment. In that sense, the
possibility of FDI, or “threat of FDI”, may limit the level of trade
protection that the government can impose.27 In the past, import
24  This measure conforms to the definition recommended by the Federal Statistical
Office (Statistisches Bundesamt). Yet, there are also other definitions. For example, Turner
and Van ‘t dack (1993, pp. 87, 136-137) compute unit labor costs on the basis of total
earnings of labor in manufacturing expressed in US dollars divided by value added in
manufacturing at current prices expressed in constant purchasing power parity (PPP)
rates. This ratio allows for relating labor costs to output per unit of time, with the resulting
unit labor costs being expressed in terms of a common currency. The merit of this approach
is that currency fluctuations influencing the value added are excluded. However, computing
unit labor costs on this basis would require data on pure host country output (i.e. units
produced per year) which is generally not available for less developed countries; see Turner
and Van ‘t dack (1993), p. 91.
25  Unit labor costs are not widely available for services despite that sector’s growing
importance in emerging markets; see Turner and Golub (1997), p. 7.
26  See Stehn (1992), p. 73.
27  See Konishi et al. (1999), pp. 290-291.
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protection instituted by host governments promised such high rates
of return to foreign investors that the efficiency of the subsidiaries
was not viewed as a major concern. However, as the majority of
emerging economies have chosen to ease restrictions on imports,
so-called “market-seeking” or “horizontal” direct investment is likely
to have fallen over time, giving way to “efficiency-seeking” or
“vertical” direct investment that requires a liberal trade environment.
This newer form of direct investment aims at exploiting sources of
competitiveness such as lower (unit) labor costs, a skilled workforce
or a more conducive business environment.28 In sum, the overall
impact of trade barriers is uncertain and depends on the nature of
FDI (horizontal versus vertical) in each case.
While the case for trade barriers fostering FDI inflows appears
quite convincing, the relationship between traditional openness
measures and FDI is less clear. The “natural” openness or outward
orientation of an economy can be thought of as the trade intensity
absent any interventionist policy measures. Thus, the ordinary
openness proxy, trade intensity in terms of either share of imports
or exports (or both) in GDP, constitutes a trade flow outcome
measure. Some authors propose that this type of openness measure
be adjusted for structural, non-policy determinants of trade intensity
such as geographic size, per-capita income or resource endowment.
This study uses as a measure of trade barriers the share of
taxes on international trade in current government revenue,
DUTY, whereby a positive coefficient can be expected for horizon-
tal FDI. This very definition is used by Singh and Jun (1995), who
report it as significantly positively correlated to relative FDI inflows
for a set of 31 developing countries. A similar measure, namely the
average level of tariffs (UNCTAD data), is tested by Pritchett
(1997) in regressions for 72 developing countries. It is the only
28 See Nunnenkamp (2001), pp. 12-13, and also Mallampally and Sauvant (1999) who,
in addition, list a third category: “resource/asset-seeking” FDI trying to capture host
country advantages in raw materials, skilled labor, innovative assets or physical
infrastructure.
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variable to be significantly correlated to both the openness measure
by Leamer (1988)29 and an indicator of non-tariff barriers.30 In
addition, this study checks the validity of a conditioned openness
variable, OPEN, i.e. modified trade intensity measured by the
residuals of regressing the logs of GDP per capita and population
on a given host country’s trade intensity (imports and exports as
share of GDP). The coefficient should be positive for vertical FDI.
External Indebtedness
Despite being an important indicator of a country’s solvency
often foreshadowing an imminent financial crisis, measures of foreign
indebtedness are used in FDI research less often than for analyzing
other capital flows. At the theoretical level, Ghura and Goodwin
(2000) argue that a rising external debt ratio, indicating a debt
overhang, induces economic agents to anticipate future tax liabilities
to service the debt. If the integration of capital markets is rather
low, the ensuing capital flight would then raise the domestic cost
of capital. Apart from conceivable political reverberations, this
effect is likely to negatively impact the overall profitability of foreign
subsidiaries. Arguments from corporate finance theory31 may be
transposed to the macro level in the sense that a relatively high
degree of risky debt may weaken a country’s ability to realize
growth possibilities via new investment. A valuable real option may
be forgone if the additional investment and payments to bondholders
(in case the option is exercised) exceed the value of the investment.
On the other hand, if the debt level of the host country is still
below a certain level perceived critical by investors, this
consideration may not apply and FDI flows may actually increase
29  Leamer (1988) constructs both an openness and a trade distortion index that measure
deviations from trade flows predicted by a modified Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model, using
data from 1982.
30  See Pritchett (1997), pp. 318, 320, 324-325. The author uses as indicator or non-
tariff barriers the import-weighted percent of tariff codes lines covered by various types
of non-tariff barriers (licenses, quotas, prohibitions) as a percentage of all tariff code lines
within the aggregate (p. 314).
31  See, for example, Myers (1977), and there in particular pp. 155, 164-165.
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with rising external indebtedness.  Among the few empirical studies
to consider the level of external debt, Pistoresi (2000) reports a
significantly negative coefficient for emerging markets’ foreign debt
per capita which is especially relevant for the Latin American sub-
sample.
Thus, a variable, DEBT, measuring the ratio of host country
external debt to GDP, was added to the regressions, recognizing
the postulated impact of rising indebtedness on FDI.
II.2.2. Non-Traditional Variables
This section gives an overview of the literature on non-
traditional factors, with emphasis on the research previously
undertaken in the area of governance.
Country Risk/Political Risk
Most studies reviewed here control for specific measures of
host country political risk. Only some refer to a broader definition
of country risk, as is the case in the aforementioned study by Jost
and Nunnenkamp (2002). For example, Mody/Srinivasan (1998)
find a strong correlation between country safeness (measured by
the Institutional Investor index) and host country share of U.S.
FDI outflows by means of the within estimator.
The issue of political risk has attracted more interest among
researchers. In a pioneering paper Schneider and Frey (1985) furnish
evidence that in emerging markets political and socioeconomic factors
are relevant on top of the “classical” macro factors. As the authors
show, estimation results for FDI inflows into industrial as well as
developing countries are significantly improved if also controlling
for governance variables such as political instability and the
ideological thrust of government. Stevens (2000), investigating plant
and equipment spending of U.S. corporations in Mexico, Brazil and
Argentina, shows that the inclusion of political factors affecting the
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operations and earnings of U.S. investors improves the goodness-
of-fit for Argentina greatly (R-squared rises from 0.19 to 0.90).32
“Headline” political risk, or rather the absence thereof, is
found to be a driving factor of developing country FDI inflows by
Singh and Jun (1995). Brunetti and Weder (1997) examine the
most prominent uncertainty measures in investment regressions,
finding a number of categories (with individual variables) –
government instability (revolutions), political violence (political
executions/war casualties), political uncertainty (black market
premium on foreign exchange, variation of real exchange rate
distortion) – consistently significant at least at the 5 percent level
and thus robust to changes in specification.
Within the set of political risk measures one can distinguish
between corruption alias administrative deficiencies and
governmental instability in the host country. The question of how
devastating corruption can be is investigated by Wei (2000) who
evaluates OECD data on industrial countries’ FDI flows to 45
economies: higher taxation and higher corruption reduce inward
FDI by 4.8% and 26%, respectively. Studying the impact of wide-
spread corruption on the rate of private investment in developing
countries, Everhart and Sumlinski (2001) find an indirect negative
effect of corruption via the quality of public investment. Put
differently, any given level of public investment will be characterized
by a higher quality than would be the case with a higher degree of
corruption present. As Lehmann (2002) argues, poor governance
introduces asymmetric information, thereby raising agency costs of
market participants incurred in dealing with supervisory agencies.
Consequently, increasing capital costs obstruct inflows of FDI
substantially.
Bubnova (2000) contends that corruption acts to prevent
democratic development and results in poor infrastructure. In
relating governance to risks facing private infrastructure investment
(measured by spreads of emerging market infrastructure bonds)
32  The regression for Brazil shows a lesser improvement; for Mexico the adjustment
is only slightly positive.
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she identifies four clusters of strong positive relationships in the set
of explanatory variables: in addition to economic performance and
religion-induced tensions, which play a lesser role in the sample
countries here, political factors include regulatory risk (corruption/
bureaucratic delays/contract enforceability) and political disorder
risk (domestic conflict/expropriation risk). Corruption and autocracy
risk account for most of the bond spread variation.
By contrast, Singh and Jun (1995) and Hubert and Pain (1999)
fail to find significance for the occurrence of strikes33 in developing
and non-EU countries, respectively. The same goes for German
FDI flows to developing countries in the 1980s, as shown by
Agarwal et al. (1991). Singh and Jun do, however, report a
significantly negative coefficient for strikes in a sub-sample of
“low FDI countries” where standoffs are more frequent.
In light of this overwhelming evidence, the bottom line of
research on governance issues is that high country/political risk
does represent an obstacle to higher inflows of FDI capital.
Accordingly, several measures of country and, more specifically,
differentiated political risk are used here. The risk data were
obtained from two professional providers of country risk estimates,
the Political Risk Services Group (in short: PRS) with its International
Country Risk Guide34 and the business magazine Euromoney with
its bi-annual country risk surveys.35 Both indices assign high scores
33  Number of work days lost in each of the host countries through strikes (Hubert and
Pain) or industrial and civic strife (Singh and Jun); see Hubert and Pain (1999), p. 173, and
Singh and Jun (1995), p. 16.
34  The PRS Group uses estimates based on information collected by its own staff which
results in the publication of 22 variables in three subcategories for 140 countries on a
monthly basis.
35  See, for example, Euromoney (2000), pp. 106-109. As a political risk rating was
added only in September 1992, no such variable could be derived from the Euromoney data.
The country risk score is calculated using nine individual, weighted categories; for
explanation of the different categories see Euromoney (1997), pp. 60-62. The individual
scores are based on a survey of economists at leading financial and economic institutions.
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to “safe” countries. Far from being the only sources of country
risk information,36 these publications enjoy a good reputation among
researchers (ICRG37 used by Brunetti and Weder (1997), Lehmann
(1999), Wei (2000), and Everhart and Sumlinski (2001); Euromoney
data used by Ramcharran (1999) and Jost and Nunnenkamp (2002))
and supply continuous data for the relevant time period.38
To isolate genuine macroeconomic risk, which, incidentally,
could also be picked up by the variation in other variables, the
variable PRSERISK was formed. Following the approach of Bubnova
(2000) described above, in this paper the political risk dimension is
further divided into subcategories of orderly business dealings, i.e.
corruption and autocracy risks, called PRSADMIN, and of political
disorder risks, PRSSTAB.39 Grouping corruption and “red tape” due
to their connectivity was brought up by Mauro (1995) as a more
precise measure of corruption than corruption alone.40
36  There are in fact many more, such as Freedom House, Business International,
Transparency International, to name just a few professional ones. Furthermore, risk
indices have been developed by academics and international development institutions
(such as the World Bank’s Country Policy Institutional Assessment). Some of the risk
indices could not be used in the first place, either because the period covered did not match
this study’s time frame or because the index did not report data for the emerging markets
examined in this study.
37  For example, Brunetti/Weder (1997) find PRS’ corruption measure more
comprehensive (and more significant) than that of Business International because the
former does not focus on narrow business transactions but rather “asks whether high
government officials are likely to demand special payments and whether illegal payments
are generally expected throughout lower levels of government” (p. 14). Conversely, Wei
(2000) criticizes that PRS does not reveal how the ratings are derived (p. 3).
38  Inevitably subjective, the survey data often provide the best information available
on the less visible aspects of governance, and such perceptions are frequently as important
as hard-to-obtain evidence; see Bubnova (2000), p. 11. Inherent subjectivity makes
comparisons of individual risk assessments difficult, inspiring Kaufmann et al. (1999) to
embark on aggregating indicators from several sources into a meta index.
39  Other subcategories of PRS’ political risk measure – external conflict, socioeconomic
conditions, military in politics, religion in politics, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability
– were omitted because they largely pertain to developing countries and do not seem to
play a decisive role in the countries assessed in this study.
40  Wide-spread corruption may lead to further bureaucratic delay as a result of officials
“dragging their feet” until receiving the expected bribe.
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Accordingly, the variable PRSADMIN can be thought of as
a measure of administrative uncertainty surrounding official
decisions that immediately affect foreign investors (at the “micro-
level”). It involves subjective assessments of the degree of
corruption (with a high rating meaning a low degree of “sleaze”),
the quality of the bureaucracy (high score for countries where the
bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic
changes in policy or interruptions in government services), and the
so-called investment profile (measuring risk of expropriation,
restrictions on profit repatriation41 and payment delays, again with
high points for low-risk countries). This exact specification was
tested by Pistoresi (2000) who, as expected, finds a significantly
negative relationship between FDI inflows to a similar set of
emerging markets and this combined administrative quality varia-
ble, which, in that case, depicts an inefficient and undependable
bureaucracy. The same result holds true in Pistoresi’s estimations
for a measure of political instability.
In this study, the corresponding variable PRSSTAB is
composed of “macro-level” factors foreign firms have to put up
with: the stability of the government (assessing both of the
government’s ability to carry out its declared programs and its
ability to stay in office), the aspect of law and order (evaluating
the strength and impartiality of the legal system as well as the
degree of popular observance of the law), and the prevalence of
internal conflict.
Agglomeration Effects
There is considerable disagreement in the literature as to
what exactly constitutes agglomeration. Some authors equate
41  The issue of repatriation restrictions facing multinational enterprises, a specific facet
of political risk, is touched upon by Ihrig (2000) in a case study of US subsidiaries in Brazil
between 1977 and 1991. The model she employs is able to capture the effect of such
restrictions on capital investment and technology transfer to the Brazilian subsidiaries.
Partial remittance restrictions are shown to cause multinationals to remit funds to the home
country, whereas full blocking, logically, prompts reinvestment of funds. However, the
Brazilian case suggests that countries who notoriously impose restrictions or threaten to
do so can increase foreign capital investment if they credibly abolish these restrictions.
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clustering effects of that kind with the size of the existing FDI
stock (perhaps lagged) or “herding” of foreign firms, whereas others
perceive the quality of the host country’s infrastructure as a suitable
proxy.42 Positive spillover effects through the widespread esta-
blishment of foreign subsidiaries play a prominent role. Commonly,
once a large multinational corporation sets up shop in one location,
others will quickly follow suit (“follow-the-leader” effect). This is
because foreign firms unable to enter in the same period as the
leader does will incur a large welfare loss compared to a scenario
where all firms enter more or less simultaneously. In the extreme,
potential late entrants may not get a foothold in the market because
of the productivity advantage already attained by the first mover.43
Well-known examples of such positive agglomeration effects are
typified by automobile production in Mexico or the Asian electronics
industry.44
In an innovate study on that issue, Wheeler and Mody (1992)
check both factors – clustering of FDI inflows and quality of the
infrastructure – on their validity for 42 developing and industrialized
countries. Both coefficients are of the same magnitude and highly
significant for the manufacturing sector. The quality of infrastructure
seems especially important for developing countries, and specifically
the electronics industry. Mody and Srinivasan (1998) examine data
on U.S. FDI to 35 countries and posit that the stock of past FDI
is strongly positively correlated with current FDI inflows in all
estimations, whereas the infrastructure variable (output of electricity
per GDP) is found to be significant only if measured by the
“between” estimator, having the authors conclude that only major
infrastructure investment may act to attract investors. Lehmann
(1999) uses lagged U.S. total investment as proxy for agglomeration
and finds it to be significantly positive in all regressions. A first-
42  See Lim (2001), p. 7. As an example for quality-of-infrastructure-proxies, Razin
(2002) finds a high positive significance of developing country telephone density for FDI
flows (p. 10).
43  See Markusen (1990), p. 2
44  See Lim (2001), pp. 5-6.
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mover effect is observed by Mody et al. (1999) in a strong partial
correlation between a Japanese firm’s plans to invest in elsewhere
in Asia and its expectation of competitors having similar plans.
The agglomeration variable used here, AGGLO, is defined as
the moving-three year average of contemporary and lagged
total FDI inflows relative to respective host country GDP. Note
that this is not simply a partially lagged endogenous variable since
it recurs to FDI flows from the rest of the world and not just
Germany. The variable aims at capturing both first-mover advantage
effects (by including contemporary flows) and the magnitude of
privately supplied infrastructure abroad over the past couple of
years.
Corporate Financing Conditions
Rarely used in empirical research, the varying availability of
relatively low-cost internal financing should intuitively play a fun-
damental role in the magnitude and timing of corporate investment
decisions, particularly with respect to efficiency-seeking FDI.
Cushman (1985) includes a corporate cash flow variable which he
lags by one year and finds significantly positively correlated to
U.S. FDI to industrialized countries. Barrell and Pain (1996) add
to their regressions for outward U.S. FDI lagged corporate profits
(significantly positive). The relevance of the level of corporate
profits for Germany is underscored by Heiduk and Hodges (1992)
in a case study of the investment activity of German multinationals.
The authors purport that, given the higher volatility of foreign
compared to domestic investment, German firms facing financial
distress tend to trim FDI before they decrease domestic investment.
As using cash flows generated within the firm is arguably
the most inexpensive way of financing investment, this study
incorporates the lagged aggregated cash flow of German firms
normalized to total corporate assets, CFLOW. Note that there is
logically no variation across host countries such that the variable
can be rendered significant only by fluctuations over time. Put
differently, CFLOW resembles a time dummy of changeable
magnitude.
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Real Exchange Rate (Volatility)
There are opposing views on the impact of the real exchange
rate (RER) on FDI inflows. An upward movement in the host country’s
RER may stir fear of protectionism among foreign investors and lead
them to invest abroad in anticipation of additional trade barriers.45
Conversely, Froot and Stein (1991) show that under credit rationing,
i.e. imperfect capital markets, a (real) exchange rate depreciation
induces foreign investors’ wealth to rise, enabling them to outbid their
competitors abroad for information-intensive assets having monitoring
costs. Therefore, aggregate FDI flows will increase in proportion to
a depreciation of the domestic currency.46 Yet, as Ghura and Goodwin
(2000) point out, the overall impact of a real depreciation is uncertain,
as imported inflation raises the price of investment goods and
consequently depresses investment.47
To avoid colinearity with the unit labor cost variable,48 the main
model forgoes a particular exchange rate variable in levels. However,
the significance of the bilateral real exchange rate, RER, is tested
in a separate regression excluding labor costs.
It is, however, quite justified to look beyond pure level effects. The
expectation of short-term changes in exchange rates may influence the
timing of investment transactions: for example, firms may precipitate
payments in currencies expected to appreciate.49 In the area of exchange
45  See Kosteletou and Liargovas (2000), p. 139
46  See Froot and Stein (1991), p. 1202. This shift in relative wealth is caused by nominal
exchange rate movements that not matched by domestic price level adjustments, rendering
deviations from purchasing power parity possible. Razin (2002) illustrates a similar wealth
effect: foreign firms would be put at an advantage over domestic borrowers by being able
to post more valuable collateral in borrowing from domestic banks. This effect naturally
applies mostly to mergers and acquisitions and less to greenfield investment. However,
the latter can be expected to grow, too, as (nominal) exchange rate depreciations – according
to the ‘relative labor cost theory’ – give foreign production a competitive edge in labor costs
over domestic output and will thus lead to higher FDI inflows; see Kosteletou and Liargovas
(2000), p. 139, and Goldberg and Klein (1997), p. 12.
47  Generally speaking, a widely-perceived deviation of the real exchange rate from its
estimated equilibrium level may affect long-run investment decisions via a shift in relative
production costs; see Barrell and Pain (1996), p. 202.
48  This would expressly apply to those countries with fixed exchange rate regimes or
de facto nominal exchange rate stability over the sample period.
49  See Barrell and Pain (1996), p. 205.
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rate volatility, several theoretical studies show that higher variability
is positively correlated with outward direct investment flows
(Cushman (1985), Aizenman (1991, 1992)50, Goldberg and Kolstad
(1995), and Sung and Lapan (2000)). In a theoretical model based
on the view taken in the real options literature, Sung and Lapan
demonstrate that by erecting more than one production facility, i.e.
opening another plant abroad, and postponing the decision as to
where to produce, a multinational firm acquires a real option whose
value increases with greater exchange rate fluctuations.51 They
posit that more volatile exchange rates induce the relative value of
opening the foreign plant to rise.52 Depending on the degree of
volatility, firms will open only the foreign plant or both. Therefore,
high exchange rate variability will promote FDI outflows to
alternative production sites.53
50  Aizenman (1992) shows that under a flexible exchange rate higher volatility of monetary
shocks induces disparities in the real wage at home and abroad, and thus induces geographic
diversification via foreign direct investment, while concurrently lowering aggregate investment
(pp. 909, 914).
51  The real option’s value is calculated as the expected value of additionally opening the
plant abroad, i.e. value of the firm with both plants exclusive of the value of merely the home
plant, minus the sunk cost incurred by opening the foreign plant. It is shown that the
differential profits increase with higher exchange rate volatility; see Sung and Lapan (2000),
p. 415, and, similarly on the real options argument, Aizenman (1992), p. 897.
52  See Sung and Lapan (2000), p. 415. This contradicts the traditional view that firms
would then reconsider foreign investment to reduce their risk exposure; see Goldberg and
Kolstad (1995), pp. 856-857.
53 This hypothesis is confirmed by several empirical studies. Stockman and Vlaar (1996)
observe that higher exchange rate volatility significantly increases the growth rate of Dutch
FDI outflows. A similar result is found by Hubert and Pain (1999) who test both real and
nominal exchange rate fluctuations separately for German data and find that nominal exchange
rate volatility negatively impacts FDI outflows, whereas the reverse holds for the real exchange
rate. The latter finding is, as the authors point out, consistent with the production shifting
hypothesis. Love and Lage-Hidalgo (2000), testing whether past volatility in the US$-peso
rate affects FDI flows to Mexico, also report a strongly positive coefficient. Furthermore,
Barrell and Pain (1996) find that an expectation of a depreciation in the host country’s currency
will postpone US investment. Cushman (1985) reports rising U.S. FDI to G7-countries in
response to an increase in the standard deviation of the expected change in the real exchange
rate. By contrast, Sin and Leung (2001) do not find a strong impact of the nominal exchange
rate on flows to developing countries up to 1992.
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In this study, exchange rate volatility is therefore modeled
along the lines of Hubert and Pain (1999) by constructing a two-
year moving average of past real exchange rate fluctuations.
It is important to note that, contrary to some of the previously
mentioned studies that simply first-difference the exchange rate,
here volatility is measured as the variance of the indexed real
exchange rate over past years, i.e. regardless of the direction of
the individual change:
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where
RERi,t is the real exchange rate between Germany and the i
th
country in a given year.54
Structural Reforms
Recent studies have been increasingly incorporating structural
reform measures in FDI host countries. The intuition is that current
or envisaged reforms in the regulatory realm will positively affect
investment conditions for foreign firms over the longer term.
However, during such adjustment periods FDI flows may actually
dwindle, as is shown by Tuman and Emmert (1999) for Japanese
FDI in 12 Latin American countries for the period 1979-1992.
During a given year of implementing economic adjustments, the
sample countries received an average of roughly $30 million less
in FDI.
54  Real exchange rates computed using consumer price indices. The RER itself is
normalized to base year 1990. An increase in the RER denotes a real appreciation of the
host country’s currency. The variances are measured as the squared annual differences
relative to the previous year. One could have used unit labor costs as indicator of the real
exchange rate as proposed by Hubert and Pain (1999), p. 174, but doing so would mean
neglecting changes in the nominal exchange rate and thus a greater degree of noise; see Barrell
and Pain (1996), p. 202.
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A genuine measure of structural reform has been developed
by Lora (2001, drawing on earlier work of 1997). This unique
meta-index for Latin American countries consists of five
subcategories (trade, financial, tax and labor market reforms, and
privatization) measured by individual indices and now covers the
period from 1985 to 1999. Lora himself does not subject his data
to econometric testing, but Fernández-Arias and Montiel (2001) do
so, exploring how structural effects, which the index measures,
relate to growth in Latin America up to 1995. Reassuringly, they
find that Lora’s structural policy index contains independent
information not already captured by four other stabilization
regressors.55 In fact, the index’s coefficient is significantly positive
and eliminates the unexplained excess of Latin American growth
(low growth despite reforms)56 observed in their baseline
regressions. To test whether this holds true for the impact of
structural reforms on FDI flows, Lora’s recently updated index,
called STRUCT, is included in the estimations for the Latin American
sub-sample.
III. METHODOLOGY
III.1. Estimation method
In principle, the parameters for each country could be
estimated, however inefficiently, by ordinary least squares (OLS).
Given the geographic proximity of the countries in question to one
another, it would be a strong assumption that each cross section
55  These are: lower public consumption (relative to GDP), lower inflation, financial
deepening (broad money to GDP), exchange rate unification (black market premium), and,
allegedly, trade intensity (imports and exports to GDP, estimates not given); see
Fernández-Arias and Montiel (2001), pp. 526, 529.
56  This often-voiced “puzzle” is discarded by the authors “in the sense that
unidentified region-specific factors depressed growth in Latin America during the 1990s,
offsetting the large positive growth impetus of the reforms”. They conclude that “the
growth response of recent reform in Latin America – that is, its marginal effect – was
adequate”; Fernández-Arias and Montiel (2001), pp. 543, 535.
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behaves entirely independent of the others, particularly given the
fact that the model assigns the same parameter vector to all units
(countries).57 Therefore, the error terms in the FDI equations are
likely to include factors common to all sample countries and thus
to be correlated between cross sections at a given time.
The SUR58 technique allows for integrating contemporaneous
correlation by estimating the full variance-covariance matrix of the
system’s disturbance vector; the individual equations are linked
only by their disturbances, hence “seemingly unrelated regressions.”
This, of course, requires that the panel be balanced.59 This
supposition renders a pooled analysis of FDI data using the SUR
estimation method more efficient than applying OLS to each country
separately since the common, immeasurable influences are
accounted for. An efficiency gain exists because the pooling
approach takes account of correlation between the error vectors
and uses information on explanatory variables included in the system
but excluded from the individual equation.60 The greater the
correlation of the disturbances, the greater the efficiency gain
obtained by applying the SUR technique.
In addition, the SUR estimation with the econometric soft-
ware STATA provides for including a first-order autoregressive
process. With this, SUR contains, in a sense, dynamic elements
which would substitute for a full-fledged dynamic estimation if the
common AR(1) coefficient were sufficiently small (less than 0.2,
for example).
57  See Greene (2003), p. 333.
58  Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. For a good overview on SUR techniques see
Dielman (1989), pp. 29-47, Judge et al. (1988), pp. 444-468, or Greene (2003), pp. 340-
362.
59 Larger sets of countries will therefore usually preclude using the SUR technique
which fortunately is not the case in this study as T=10 (years) and N=6 (countries).
Another prerequisite for using SUR estimation is that T be greater than N, otherwise the
feasible GLS estimator cannot be calculated.
60  See Judge et al. (1988), p. 450.
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III.2 Statistical Properties
Following a “general-to-specific” approach, first a model that
includes all explanatory variables is estimated. Subsequently, the
list of variables is narrowed down to the ones found robust in an
Extreme Bounds Analysis following Leamer (1983, 1985) and Levine
and Renelt (1992); for detailed explanation see Wezel (2003). In
addition, alternative variables for risk, cost, and openness measure
are estimated separately. The estimation outcome contains
standardized coefficients bj
* = bj (sxj/sy) with sxj being the standard
deviation of the jth exogenous variable and sy the standard deviation
of the endogenous variable.61 As a double-log linear model allowing
the coefficients to be interpreted as elasticities was not feasible
due to the occurrence of negative FDI flows, this standardization
allows for comparing the “weights” with which the individual va-
riables enter the equation. The measure of goodness-of-fit has to
be derived from the Wald test statistic and is therefore usually
called “pseudoR2”.62
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
IV.1. Econometric results
The regression results for the sample provides a number of
valuable insights (see below). First and most importantly, it is shown
that country risk clearly matters in the region. Both risk indices,
PRSCRISK in (1) and EMCRISK in (2), are strongly significant
with the expected sign and carry the greatest weight among varia-
bles. Further decomposition reveals that the economic risk measure,
PRSERISK, if chosen instead of headline country risk is strongly
positively significant (coefficient = 0.3132, z-ratio = 4.68) as opposed
to PRSPRISK (ß = 0.0606, z = 0.84). Among the political risk
components, administrative quality, PRSADLEA (replacing headline
61  For further reference see Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981), pp. 90-91.
62  See Greene (2003), p. 97, for derivation. Verbeek (2001), p. 182, discussing
alternative measures to R2, makes use of the likelihood ratio statistic which is asymptotically
equivalent to the Wald test statistic.
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political risk) is significant and correctly signed (ß = 0.2084, z =
2.37), whereas PRSSTAB, measuring domestic stability, is negatively
correlated with FDI inflows.
Second, German FDI in that region seems to have been
geared towards tapping markets protected against imports over the
sample period since the tariff variable, DUTY, is robustly positively
significant while ULC, an indicator of efficiency-seeking FDI, is
not. In addition, agglomeration effects have clearly spurred German
FDI flows with a view to securing market access in the face of
strong competition from abroad. The other non-traditional variables
– cash flows of German parent companies and real exchange rate
volatility – cannot be shown to have a significant impact on FDI
flows. An alternative model using the real exchange rate, RER, and
the conditioned openness measure, OPEN, instead of unit labor
costs and taxation of trade, respectively, worsens the fit of the
regression compared to (1) as both alternative variables end up
being insignificant. The parsimonious model (4) includes country
risk, taxation of trade and agglomeration effects – variables
significant in (1) that were found to be robust to the inclusion of
the certain combinations of other exogenous variables.
Lastly, an unexpected result is found for Lora’s structural
reform index (not shown here): contrary to the intuition, STRUCT,
turns out to be significantly negative (z-value: -4.75) if added to
regression (1), and its inclusion improves the regression’s fit
considerably (pseudoR2 rises to 0.75), leaving room for
interpretation.63 Closer inspection of the data series reveals that
63  Coinciding with the results of Tuman and Emmert, current crisis conditions might
overshadow structural reforms whose beneficial impact may only take root in later periods.
On the other hand, as illustrated in section 1, even expectations of structural reforms suffice
to prompt investment decisions. Therefore, one can expect actual reforms depicted in the
index to contemporaneously affect decision-making. Incidentally, lagging STRUCT by one
period does not change the picture greatly (it remains significantly negative at the 1 percent
level).
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SUR Estimation for six Latin American Emerging Market Economies
Regression with individual country effects, heteroskedastic with
cross-sectional correlation; observations: 60
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDPCAP -0.086 -0.084 -0.572
(-0.62) (-0.56) (-2.23)**
PRSCRISK 0.294
(5.75)*** 0.222 0.273
(3.28)*** (6.02)***
EMCRISK 0.265
(2.55)**
ULC 0.118 0.159
-1.05 -1.12
RER -0.09
(-0.71)
DUTY 0.174 0.202 0.225
(2.09)** (2.45)** (4.12)***
OPEN 0.269
-1.04
DEBT 0.028 0.038 -0.304
-0.38 -0.35 (-1.95)*
AGGLO 0.183 0.168 0.361 0.182
(2.31)** (2.08)** (2.94)*** (6.63)***
CFLOW 0.028 0.084 -0.039
-0.41 (1.72)* (-0.56)
RERVOL 0.076 0.105 -0.044
-1.23 -1.49 (-0.66)
PseudoR2 0.65 0.41 0.4 0.54
Z-values in parentheses; ***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level,
*=significant at the 10% level
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 there is a persistent improvement in index scores for almost all of
the countries which contrasts sharply with the relatively high
volatility of German FDI flows to the region. The negative correlation
between FDI and the reform index could also owe something to
the fact that index scores rose excessively in the early 1990s when
a wave of privatization set in.64 Soaring scores are, however, not
mirrored by German FDI flows in the early 1990s, presumably
because German firms participated less in privatization than did
investors from other nations.65
IV.2. Specification tests
Specification tests for the imposed restrictions – individual
country effects, heteroskedastic error terms, cross-sectional
correlation and within-group autocorrelation – were run one by
one, with each additional restriction being compared to the one
marginally less restrictive (e.g. merely heteroskedastic error terms).
The statistics of a likelihood ratio test with the null hypotheses of
no individual country effects, solely homoskedastic error terms and
no cross-sectional correlation consistently exceeded the critical
values for the c2-distribution, thus rejecting the null hypotheses. By
contrast, the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation could not be
rejected, unsurprisingly so as the autoregression coefficient was
generally less than 0.10.
V. CONCLUSION
This study, using an innovative definition of an investment
flow variable embodying first differences of FDI stocks corrected
for effective participation rates, previously included balance-sheet
depreciation and subsequently repatriated profits, affirms that the
issue of country risk does matter for German FDI flows to Latin
64  This is true of all sample countries with the exception of Chile, whose privatization
had already begun in the early 1980s; see Birch and Braga (1993), pp. 122-123 and 126.
65  See Nunnenkamp (1998), pp. 25-26.
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America in the 1990s. The regression outcome for this FDI “flow”
variable normalized to GDP confirms the widely-held hypothesis
that a high degree of economic and certain elements of political
risk is detrimental to cross-border equity participation. Aiming to
put this verdict on a broader foundation, the study uses two
professional country risk indices, both of which turn out to be
highly significant. This finding thus confirms the presumption that
international investors indeed perceive impending changes in the
macroeconomic and regulatory environment. Subdividing country
risk into its components, it is found that economic risk represents
the main driving force behind this unequivocal result, whereas the
evidence for headline political risk is best described as erratic
owing to its disparate individual elements. While the measure of
administrative quality alias corruption and malfeasance by the host
government is consistently strongly associated with marginal FDI
inflows, the variable of host country political stability turns out
insignificant or even displays a negative sign.
Furthermore, FDI inflows to Latin America throughout the
last decade are to be called “market-seeking” in that German firms
were apparently impelled to establish a presence abroad by the
necessity to overcome critical host country tariff barriers and, in a
sense, to react in a timely manner to rising direct investment on the
part of foreign competitors.
In sum, researchers studying foreign direct investment in
emerging market economies ought to take increased account of
non-traditional variables such as country risk or agglomeration
effects. The econometric results of this study affirm that the
discernible trend towards factoring in measures of the regulatory
environment facing foreign investors is clearly called for. As “soft”
locational factors become more material in the eyes of investors,
analyses incorporating qualitative assessments of host countries
are likely to gain further prominence in FDI research.
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